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PHIL 5191/6191
Weekly Assignments

    • The default is to outline the passage I assign.
    • If you choose a different passage:
      • make sure it contains an argument.
      • you have to tell me what it is. (I'm not a mind reader.)
      • please make it terse---a paragraph or two, not a chapter, or anything like a chapter. (I have to read the passage side by side with your outline, to check that the latter correctly represents the argument in the former.) My experience is that attempts to outline longer stretches of text don't generally work out well.
  1. Aug. 20 (for those of you who have already taken a class from me, who know what these outline assignments -- not the same as microcommentary assignments! -- are supposed to look like, and who want to get an early start): Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix I, sec. V, first two paragraphs, starting with "It appears evident that the ultimate ends..." (In the standard Selby-Bigge/Nidditch edition, this is on p. 293).
  2. Aug. 27: Either Korsgaard, "Skepticism about Practical Reason" (in VPR), p. 114, 1st para. (this is the last para. of sec. IV; and remember, the order of exposition isn't necessarily the order of argument); or Michael Smith, "The Humean Theory of Motivation," p. 47 (from "Here, then, is a second objection") thru the top 4 lines of p. 48.
  3. Sept. 3: Either Kolnai, "Deliberation Is of Ends," p. 263, para. starting, "That the technical preamble to action...", to 15 lines from the bottom of the page ("...beyond its mere preliminary information"); or Brewer, Retrieval, on p. 23, top para., from "Yet the propositionalist must limit..." to the end of the para.
  4. Sept. 10: Either O'Neill, "Consistency in Action," para. bridging pp. 317f ("An argument of the same type...") ; or Korsgaard, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," p. 26 (top, "So particularistic willing is neither...") to p. 27 (3rd para., thru "...of something within him").
  5. Sept. 17: Either Murdoch, "The Idea of Perfection" (VPR ch. 18), para. bridging pp. 410f ("I said that the argument..."); or Brewer, Retrieval, on p. 80, first full para. ("There is an additional source of support...").
  6. Sept. 24: Either the Davidson excerpt on the readings for the session (remember to sandblast away the narrative!); or Mandler, p. 384, first full para., starting "A standard challenge is put..."
  7. Oct. 1: Either Bratman, "Taking Plans Seriously," p. 205 (from the top, "A natural conjecture..." thru the para. bridging 205-06); or Brandom, "Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning," p. 471 (from "The Davidsonian will respond...") to 472 ("...even on the theoretical side").

    8. FROM HERE ON OUT, WEEKLY ASSIGNMENTS ARE TWO-PART; SEE THE REQUIREMENTS PAGE FOR DETAILS

  8. Oct. 8: BONUS WEEKLY ASSIGNMENT! Conlisk, "Why Bounded Rationality?", pp. 686f, 2 paras. starting (at the bottom of 686) "Unbounded rationality is typically formulated..."; look at the last para. on 687, the first couple of sentences starting "The regress problem seems to block..." for orientation.
  9. Oct. 15: Landesman, "When to Terminate a Charitable Trust?" (in Analysis, 55 (1), 1995: 12-13 [means you can also find it through the Marriott catalog]; this is a very short piece; extract the argument for the whole thing).
  10. Oct. 22: Nussbaum, "The Protagoras: A Science of Practical Reasoning," either pp. 167f, from "We are asked to imagine..." through "...whatever ends that creature forms"; or pp. 185-87 (starting at "At this point, interpreters..." to the bottom of 187). (For both passages, you will need to abstract away from the story to the underlying argument, and the argument will fall into place more easily if you bear in mind the discussion elsewhere in Nussbaum's chapter.)
  11. Oct. 29: Anscombe, Intention, sec. 4, para. starting "Now it can easily seem..." (This is actually three converging arguments; if you can't see how to merge all of them into one, focus on what comes after "And, finally..." But get them all if you can.)
  12. Nov. 5: Anscombe, Intention, either sec. 19, 2nd para., starting "That an action is not called...", up to "...performs a given intentional action" (i.e., don't do the sub-argument starting "What makes it true..."); or sec. 20, the subheading (a), at "This supposition, we might say...", up to "...retain hold is not a concept of intention".
  13. Nov. 12: Anscombe, Intention, either sec. 27, from "Is there ever a place..." to "...what the man's intentions really are" [i.e., 5 lines from the bottom of p. 47]; or sec. 30, on p. 54, para. starting "My example to refute such a view is this" (remember to abstract away from the example).
  14. Nov. 19: Anscombe, Intention, either sec. 37, from "But is not anything wantable..." to "...we want to know what 'having' amounts to"; or sec. 45 (but only if you can see how to make it come out different than the argument in sec. 29, last paragraph).
  15. Nov. 26: Small, "Practical Knowledge," p. 12, para. starting "These passages suggest..." (of course, you'll need to look the passages directly above). Alternatively, Vardar, pp. 18f, para. starting "Maxims are general intentions..."
  16. Dec. 3: Nguyen, "Games and the Art of Agency," para. starting "But why do we take on that temporary agency?" (pp. 443f in the Phil Rev published version, p. 19 of the online archived version).