Mètaètica mìlliana. Quaderni di Scienza Politica, 17(2): 245-265. August 2010. Reprinted (expanded English version) in The
Great Endarkenment (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2015).
On Being Bored Out of Your Mind.
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104(2): 163-184. 2004. (JSTOR)
Does the Categorical Imperative Give Rise to a Contradiction in the Will? Philosophical Review 112(4): 525-560. October 2003. (JSTOR; reprinted, with postscript, in Ethics Done Right.)
Murdoch, Practical Reasoning, and Particularism. Notizie di Politeia 18(66): 64-87. 2002. (Reprinted in Ethics Done Right.)
Commensurability in Perspective. Topoi 21(1-2): 217-226. 2002. (Reprinted in Ethics Done Right; Springer Link.)
What's the Use of Utility? Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29(2): 113-136. Spring 2000. (Reprinted in Ethics Done Right; JSTOR.)
Coherence: The Price of the Ticket. Journal of Philosophy, 97(2): 82-93. February 2000. (JSTOR.)
Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility. Ethics, 110(2): 282-310. January 2000. (JSTOR; reprinted in Ethics Done Right.)
Moral Values and Secondary Qualities. American Philosophical Quarterly 36(3):253-255. July 1999 (JSTOR).
Deliberative Coherence. (By Elijah Millgram and Paul Thagard.) Synthese 108(1): 63-88. July 1996 (JSTOR).
Williams' Argument Against External Reasons. Nous, 30(2): 197-220. June 1996. (JSTOR; reprinted in R. J. Wallace, Reason, Emotion and Will [Brookfield: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1999]: 137-160.)
Was Hume a Humean? Hume Studies, 21(1): 75-93. April 1995. (Reprinted in R. Cohon, Hume: Moral and Political Philosophy [Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate/Dartmouth, 2001]: 39-57; and in Ethics Done Right.)
Pleasure in Practical Reasoning. The Monist, 76(3): 394-415. July 1993. (JSTOR; reprinted in Varieties of Practical Reasoning.)
Harman's Hardness Arguments. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72(3): 181-202. September 1991. (University of Utah Institutional Repository link; reprinted in The Philosopher's Annual 14: 233-254. 1991.)
The Invention of Value and the Value of Humanity. In S. Buss and
L. N. Theunissen, Rethinking the Value of Humanity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2023): 366-393.
Bounded Agency. In L. Ferrero, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of
Agency (London: Routledge, 2022): 68-76.
Who Wrote
Nietzsche's Autobiography? In J. Ulatowski and L. van
Zyl, Virtue, Narrative, and Self (New York:
Routledge, 2020): 185-213.
Mill's Epiphanies.
In C. Macleod and D. Miller, A Companion to Mill (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017):
12-29.
Mill's and Whewell's Competing Visions of Logic.
In A. Loizides, Mill's A System of Logic:
Critical Appraisals (New York: Routledge, 2014):
101-121. (T & F)
Segmented Agency. In M. Vargas and G. Yaffe,
Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of
Michael Bratman (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014): 152-189. Reprinted (with postscript) in
The Great Endarkenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
Relativism, Coherence, and the Problems of Philosophy.
In F. O'Rourke, What Happened in and to Moral Philosophy
in the Twentieth Century? Philosophical Essays in Honor of
Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 2013): 392-422.
Mill's Incubus. In B. Eggleston, D. Miller and D. Weinstein, John Stuart Mill and the Art of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011): 169-191.
Pluralism about Action. In T. O'Connor and C. Sandis, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 90-96.
Virtue for Procrastinators. In C. Andreou and M. White, The Thief of Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 151-164.
Applied Ethics, Moral Skepticism and Reasons with Expiration Dates. In S. Black and E. Tiffany, Reasons to be Moral Revisited (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2009): 263-280.
Reprinted in The Great Endarkenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). (Project MUSE)
The Persistence of Moral Skepticism and the Limits of Moral Education. In H. Siegel, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 245-259.
D'où venons-nous... Que sommes nous... Où allons-nous? In D. Callcut, Reading Bernard Williams (New York: Routledge, 2009): 141-165. Reprinted in The Great Endarkenment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).
Specificationism. In J. Adler and L. Rips, Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 731-747.
Reasonably Virtuous. In Ethics Done Right.
Hume, Political Noncognitivism, and the History of England. In Ethics Done Right.
How to Make Something of Yourself. In D. Schmidtz, Robert Nozick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 175-198.
Practical Reasoning: The Current State of Play. In Varieties of Practical Reasoning: 1-26.
Deciding to Desire. In C. Fehige and U. Wessels, Preferences (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1998): 3-25. (Reprinted in Practical Induction.)
Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning. In R. Chang, Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997): 151-169. (Reprinted in Ethics Done Right.)
Varieties of Practical Reasoning. In G. Meggle, Analyomen 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997): vol. 3, 280-294. (Reprinted, as "Varieties of Practical Reasoning and Varieties of Moral Theory," in Ethics Done Right.)
Inference to the Best Plan: A Coherence Theory of Decision. (By Paul Thagard and Elijah Millgram.) In D. Leake and A. Ram, Goal-Driven Learning (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995): 439-454.
Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die Unterscheidung zwischen Tatsachen und Werten. In C. Fehige and G. Meggle, Zum moralischen Denken (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995): 354-388. (English mss)